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In 1937, one of the most perceptive critics associated with the Menshevik 
movement in Parisian exile, Vera Aleksandrova, summarized her misgivings 
about Moscow's evolving official line in the following way: 
The most characteristic aspect of the newly-forming ideology . . . is the 
downgrading of socialist eIements within it. This doesn't mean that 
socialist phraseology has disappeared or is disappearing. Not at all. The 
majority of all slogans still contain this socialist element, but it no longer 
carries its previous ideological weight, the socialist element having 
ceased to play a dynamic role in the new slogans. It is most possible to 
see these subtle moves in minor but representative examples. At first, 
one was to speak of the USSR as the "country of the proletarian 
dictatorship," and then the "motherland of socialism" and the 
"motherland of toilers of the whole world." During the "socialism in one 
country" construction period, the USSR was referred to officially as the 
"socialist fatherland." Toward the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the 
more intimate [term] "socialist motherland," or "soviet motherland" 
appeared, while today [the USSR] is referred to over and over again as 
simply "our motherland." According to our contemporaries' perceptions, 
"our motherland" sounds warmer, more joyful and less official and 
bureaucratic than "socialist motherland." 
Even more heretical, according to Aleksandrova, was the fact that class 
analysis had been eclipsed by the rehabilitation of non-Marxist analytical 
categories: 'props from the historic past - the people, ethnicity, the 
motherland, the nation and patriotism - play a large role in the new 
ideology."2 
What was it about Soviet propaganda in the mid-to-late 1930s that had so 
incensed Aleksandrova? Put most bluntly, she was reacting to no less than an 
ideological volte-face in which 1917's emphasis on proletarian inter- 
nationalism had been superseded by a new interest in russocentrism and the 
Russian historical past. In fact, Soviet propaganda during these years came to 
display characteristics that commentators like Benedict Anderson, Raphael 
Samuel, Linda Colley and others typically associate with nationalism and the 
nation-state,3 especially the focus on "the people, the ethnicity, the motherland, 
the nation and patriotism." This article seeks to trace the process that 
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Aleksandrova observed during the 1930s, examining the semantic fluctuation 
of Soviet interwar sloganeering and the "downgrading of the socialist elements 
within it." Such an investigation can illustrate how the celebration of Marxist 
thematics and Soviet patriotism during the early-to-mid 1930s ultimately 
contributed to the ascendancy of a more russocentric, etatist ideological line 
late in the decade. 
Aleksandrova had good reason to write that the transformation underway 
in 1937 was essentially an "ideological metamorphosis.'''' After all, a shift to 
ethnic particularism in the 1930s - especially Russian ethnic particularism - 
would seem utterly incompatible with the party ideology of the 1920s. Over the 
course of the first fifteen years of Soviet power, M. N. Pokrovskii and other 
early Soviet historian-ideologists had all tended to vilify russocentrism, 
painting pre-revolutionary Russian history in exclusively dark colors as the 
story of a chauvinistic, colonizing nation carrying out the will of an oppressive 
tsarist s y ~ t e m . ~  They proposed as an alternative a propaganda line based on 
Marxist-Leninism which foregrounded the study of historical materialism, 
social forces, class antagonism and economic development on an international 
scale. As if in reference to the line from the Communist Manifesto that "the 
workers do not have a fatherland,"6 ideological tracts during the 1920s 
repeatedly emphasisized the primacy of class analysis. Even after the 
inauguration of the "Socialism in One Country" thesis in the mid-1920s, 
Soviet propagandists continued to stress class as a more fundamental and 
decisive social category than other paradigms drawn along ethnic or national 
lines. A well-known NEP-era legal commentator epitomized this approach in 
1927, declaring: "in our times, patriotism's role is that of an extremely 
reactionary ideology, the task of which is to justify imperialist bestiality and 
deaden the proletariat's class consciousness." Summarizing well the prevailing 
view in the press, the article continued that although it was reasonable for 
workers to show loyalty to societies organized in their interest, such an emotion 
had little to do with "national7' or "ethnic" affinities. It was, rather, 
internationalist, proletarian solidarity being at the heart of the emotion and not 
national borders or blood? As a result of such thinking, the class-based Soviet 
allegiance system during the 1920s did not attempt to rally all segments of 
society together; indeed, non-labouring elements and other tsarist hold-overs 
were generally considered incapable of loyalty to the workers' state and were 
even forbidden to bear arms in defense of the USSR.~ A left-leaning American 
observer commented at the time that the emerging society was "not 
handicapped by patriotism" - comparing such beliefs to religiosity, he 
observed that they were "sentimental idealisms to the materialist ~olsheviks."~ 
But less than five years later, Stalin was starting to call such militancy into 
question. Acknowledging at a major conference in 193 1 that Marx and Engels 
had been right that "in the past we didn't have and could not have had a 
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fatherland," he cautioned against taking such a line of reasoning too far. After 
all, "now, since we've overthrown capitalism and power belongs to the worlung 
class, we have a fatherland and will defend its independence."I0 
What was responsible for this about-face? Apparently, the party hierarchy 
had become frustrated with the previous decade's ineffective ideological line 
(particularly its materialist and anti-patriotic aspects)." Realizing that such 
concepts were too arcane and abstract to inspire the USSR's poorly educated 
population, Stalin and his colleagues began to look for a more pragmatic, 
populist alternative which would focus on the rather iconoclastic idea of a 
"socialist fatherland" (to use Aleksandrova's expression). By the mid- 1930s, 
Pravda was promoting precisely such a view without reservation: "Soviet 
patriotism is a burning feeling of boundless love, a selfless devotion to one's 
motherland and a profound responsibility for her fate and defense, which 
issues forth like mighty spring waters from the depths of our people." New 
sloganeering attempted to rally to the proletarian cause people from outside the 
industrial working class, ranging from peasants like A. S. Molokova to scholars 
like Academician A. Bogomolets and the Arctic explorer 0. Iu. Shmidt.I2 In 
other words, the 1920s' orthodox view of class-based internationalist loyalty 
had been supplanted by a new notion of patriotic loyalty revolving around the 
interchangeable concepts of "motherland" and "fatherland,'' a propaganda line 
which aspired to unite all segments of the society together for the first time 
since 1917. G. Vasil'kovskii elaborated on this shift in a prominent article in 
Pravda in May 1934. Echoing Stalin's 1931 commentary, he argued that 
although Marx and Engels had been correct in 1848 that "the workers do not 
have a fatherland," the October 1917 revolution had changed things 
dramatically by producing a workers' state in the midst of a capitalist 
encirclement.I3 In such a situation, patriotic loyalty to the fatherland was not 
only possible, but desirable. Moreover, official coverage of the issue in the 
press indicated that social origin and class were no longer to limit one's ability 
to be a Soviet loyalist: not only could people from outside the ranks of the 
industrial proletariat like peasants and scholars now genuinely support Soviet 
power, but even members of the old nobility like Count Aleksei Tolstoi could 
be welcomed to the cause.I4 The decisive role of class consciousness in Soviet 
ideology had given way to a new sense of allegiance based on membership 
within Soviet society. The entire notion of "Soviet patriotism" would be given 
a firm theoretical basis by K. B. Radek in 1936,15 marking the maturation of a 
major press campaign which expanded the notion of "Soviet" from a party- 
oriented affinity based on class to a broader understanding which would 
henceforth encompass geographic and cultural semantics as we11.16 
Populism complemented this departure from class as the sole 
organizational principle of Soviet society. Such an initiative was launched as 
early as 193 1 by people concerned with propaganda and societal mobilization 
like A. M. Gor'kii, who contended that heroes could be used to popularize the 
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nascent patriotic line "by example." A marked contrast to the 1920s' focus on 
anonymous social forces and class struggle, this led to the prioritizing of what 
was essentially a new genre of agitational literature. Prominent multi-volumed 
series like Gor'kii's History of Plants and Factories and The History of the 
Civil War in the USSR began to assemble a new pantheon of Soviet heroes, 
socialist myths and modern-day fables. This "search for a usable past"17 not 
only focused on shock workers in industry and agriculture, but also lavished 
attention on prominent Old Bolshevik revolutionaries, industrial planners, 
party leaders, komsorn~l '~  officials, comintern activists, Red Army heroes, 
non-Russians from the republican party organizations and even famous 
members of the secret police.19 Such populist, heroic tales from the recent past 
were seen as providing a common narrative that the entire society would be 
able to relate to - a rallying-call with greater social application than the 
previous decade's narrow and impersonal focus on class and materialism. 
Reflecting emergent trends in Socialist Realism20 as well as Stalin's belief 
in the traditionalist notion of "the great men of hi~tory,"~' this stress on 
heroism took center stage at the first conference of the Soviet Writers' Union 
in 1 9 3 4 . ~ ~  In the wake of this conference, a massive array of literature was 
commissioned to develop and expand upon the new Soviet Olympus and its 
pantheon of contemporary heroes. Films like Counterplan, Chapaev, The 
Happy Fellows, Circus, The Frontier, Flyers, The Courageous Seven, Miners 
and Volga-Volga complemented the campaign with celluloid agitation. 
Epitomizing this type of propaganda is one of the final scenes in G. V. 
Aleksandrov's film The Radiant Path, a late example of this genre. Mounting 
a podium at an industrial exhibition, the heroine, an illiterate maid-turned- 
engineer and Supreme Soviet Deputy, leads her audience in a rousing verse 
from the film's theme song "The March of the Enthusiasts": 
In these days of great construction sites 
In the merry din, the ringing and the lights, 
I send my greetings to this country of heroes 
To this country of scientists, to this country of dreamers!23 
Both populist and pragmatic, such films aimed to inspire "by example," 
mobilizing Soviet citizens of different social origins, professional occupations 
and ethnicities under the common banner of Soviet patriotic heroism. 
But it would be incorrect to think that film was the chief vehicle for this 
propaganda, as much of the content for the new campaign was supplied by a 
torrential wave of books and artwork rolling off the presses. Party history texts 
and glossy picture albums appearing in massive print-runs detailed heroism on 
the factory floor as well as in construction projects, the non-Russian republics 
and even such exotic fields as aeronautics and polar e~p lo ra t i on .~~  Heroic Old 
Bolsheviks (e.g. A. S. Enukidze, Ia. E. Rudzutak), as well as prominent figures 
from the ranks of industry (Iu. L. Piatakov), the party (A. I. Rykov), the 
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komsomol (A. V Kosarev), the comintern (0. A. Piatnitskii), the Red Army (A. 
I. Egorov), the republican parties (F. Khodzhaev) and the NKVD (Ia. Peters, N. 
I. Ezhov), received tremendous acclaim and seemed destined to grace the 
pages of official propaganda tracts for many years to come. As noted above, 
such books, posters and films were designed to elaborate upon the Soviet 
"usable past," complementing Socialist Realism's fictional heroes with famous 
and recognizable personalities from the first fifteen years of Soviet power. 
But although this Soviet patriotic populism was expected to supply a 
unifying narrative that would provide for an upswell of social support for the 
regime, the campaign faltered within only a few years of its inception. The 
Great Terror, which tore gaping holes in the fabric of the party hierarchy, the 
bureaucracy, the military high command, and the intelligentsia between 1936 
and 1938, was - by its very nature -unable to leave the new Soviet pantheon 
of heroes unscathed. As S. V Zhuravlev explains in his monograph on the 
multi-volumed History of Plants and Factories book series, the launching of 
the purges quickly came to wreak havoc with the new propaganda line. For 
instance, 
. . . work on the book [about the Moscow metro system] was undermined 
in 1936. Mass repressions, beginning in Metrostroi [the metro 
construction organization], affected the members of the editorial board 
under Kosarev as well as the best and most active of the workers, 
specialists and construction leadership - that is, precisely those people 
who were supposed to "populate" the fundamental book on the history 
of the metro 
This same phenomenon would be repeated with histories of the party, the Red 
Army and the komsomol, as successive waves of purging stripped bare the 
emerging pantheon of heroes and depopulated the narratives under 
construction. Similar fates befell projects focusing on industrial zones like 
Magnitogorsk and Moscow's Stalin auto plant.26 The infamous 1934 book on 
the construction of the Belomor Canal had to be hastily withdrawn from 
circulation late in 1937 when its editorial board and many of its principle 
characters were arre~ted.~' Dovetailing with the Belomor Canal book was the 
1934 Russian-language edition of Uzbekistan at 10 Years. A glossy photo 
album designed by the famous graphic artist A. M. Rodchenko, it required 
extensive airbrushing before appearing in Uzbek during the following year 
when the fall of Avel' Enukidze necessitated his removal from group portraits 
printed in the volume.28 Even in revised form, however, Uzbekistan at 10 Years 
did not remain in circulation for long due to the widening maw of the party 
purges. Rodchenko's own copy of the book reveals preparations for a third 
edition in a particularly gruesome manner: blacked out in India ink are the 
pictures of prominent party and state hnctionaries like Ia. E. Rudzutak and Ia. 
Peters, as well as luminaries from the Uzbek party organization like F. 
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Khodzhaev, A. Ikramov, A. A. Tsekher, D. Abikova, A. Babaev and T. 
Khodzhaev, all of whom "disappeared" between 1936 and 1938.29 
While the sagas surrounding the Belomor and Uzbek books are 
instructive, perhaps nothing was as dramatic as the fiasco surrounding the first 
volume of the celebrated History of the Civil War in the USSR series. A 
narrative focusing on the prelude to the revolutionary events of October 19 17, 
this enormous tome required reissuing in 1938 after the pages of its first 
edition were found to be littered with the names of Old Bolsheviks who had 
vanished during the on-going purges. Brief consideration of the volume's 
contents graphically illustrates how the Great Terror compromised the 
propaganda value of such texts. Of the sixty-eight individuals who are 
mentioned in a positive light on the pages of the 1935 edition, fifty-eight were 
given treatment broad enough to be considered truly "heroic." During the first 
stages of the party purges in 1936, nearly half of the members of this pantheon 
were arrested, requiring the volume to be withdrawn from circulation. When 
the second edition appeared in 1938, it had been stripped of numerous pictures, 
illustrations and some 27 pages of text, not to mention all passing references 
to fallen heroes like Piatakov, Rykov and ~ ia tn i t sk i i .~~  The next volume in the 
series - a 600-page book concerning the single month of October 191 7 - did 
not appear until 1943, the five-year delay apparently stemming from the 
difficulty involved in drafting a detailed narrative about the revolution without 
mentioning dozens of individuals now considered enemies of the pe~p le .~ '  The 
third volume in the series would not appear until 1957. 
But the purges' fall-out was not limited to commemorative albums and 
picture books. A. P. Dovzhenko's film Shchors, a civil war epic about a 
Ukrainian revolutionary commissioned in 1935, had to be reshot after Shchors' 
right-hand man fell victim to the purges and had to be removed from the 
~creenplay .~~ Prominent mention of fallen Red Army heroes like A. I. Egorov 
required excision from public school history texts between 1937 and 1941 .33 
The release of the seminal Short Course on the History of the All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was repeatedly postponed as the purges' 
bloodletting necessitated the removal of numerous names - not only from the 
narrative, but from the book's editorial board as well. Finally released in the 
fall of 1938, the Short Course required additional revisions two years later in 
order to eliminate all mention of N. I. Ezhov, who had been arrested and shot 
during the intervening period.34 Rurnors of further purges even endangered the 
small library of publications revolving around 0. Iu. Shmidt, the Cheliuskintsy 
and other hero-explorers of the far north.35 Uncertainty on the ground level 
over what to read (and what to teach) panicked officials and propagandists 
alike, bringing political agitation efforts in the society to a ~ t ands t i l l .~~  
Propaganda revolving around Soviet patriotism was virtually hamstrung by the 
events of 1936- 1938 due to the fact that this campaign had been predicated on 
the ability to propagandize heroes from the recent past. Unable to even publish 
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a tenable biography of Stalin for much of the 1930s due to the purges' effect 
on the General Secretary's entourage,37 the rallying of popular support for the 
regime "by example" became almost prohibitively difficult. This state of affairs 
ultimately forced the party hierarchy to resume its now increasingly frantic 
"search for a usable past" according to an entirely different strategy. 
On the eve of the meltdown of the Soviet pantheon of heroes, another 
campaign - "the Friendship of the Peoples" - was maturing under the same 
patriotic rubric. Designed to aid in the mobilization of the diverse Soviet 
nations, it had been inaugurated by Stalin in December 1 9 3 5 ~ ~  and revolved 
around the interethnic cooperation and racial harmony purportedly made 
possible by socialism.39 That being said, it also contained another dimension 
that had first surfaced (interestingly enough) in the 1934 article by 
Vasil'kovskii referred to above: the valorization of the Russian proletariat 
"who gave the world the October revolution." Taboo since 19 17, this Russian 
ethnic particularism was supported by references to a then little-known 
fragment of Leniniana entitled "On the National Pride of the Great 
~ u s s i a n s . ' ~ ~  An integral, if not officially-acknowledged element of the 
"Friendship of the Peoples" campaign, this russocentric undercurrent 
resurfaced again in a Pravda editorial in early 1936: 
All the peoples -participants in the great socialist construction - may 
be proud of the results of their labour; every one of them - from the 
smallest to the largest - are Soviet patriots enjoying a full array of 
rights. First among these equals is the Russian people, the Russian 
workers and the Russian toilers, whose role throughout the whole Great 
Proletarian Revolution, from the first victories to the present day's 
brilliant period of development, is exceptionally large. 
Why was this russocentrism such a central component of the "Friendship of the 
Peoples" sloganeering? Apparently, the purges' paralysis of campaigns 
revolving around individual Soviet heroes had left few alternatives to the 
rehabilitation of an ethnically-organized "usable past." Stalin's praise of the 
dexterous "revolutionary Russian sweep-of-the-hand," repeated several times 
in the text of the editorial, was not accidentally juxtaposed against the under- 
development of the non-Russian Soviet peoples. In the wake of this article, the 
parenthetical expression "first among equals" would be used with increasing 
frequency in reference to the Russian people's place in Soviet society:' 
foreshadowing the later emergence of an explicit ethnic hierarchy. 
Although the press initially limited its Russian ethnic particularism to 
contributions during the revolution, with time, Civil War victories42 and the 
Stakhanovite movement also assumed Russian  characteristic^?^ Then, in 
January 1937, this cultural sphere of influence was expanded beyond the 
parameters of the Soviet experience itself, when the figurehead President of the 
USSR, M. I. Kalinin, proclaimed at a major conference that: 
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The Russian people have drawn out of their midst no few people who, 
by means of their talent, have raised the'world's cultural level - 
Lomonosov, Pushkin, Belinskii, Dobroliubov, Chernyshevskii, 
Nekrasov, Shchedrin, Chekhov, Tolstoi, Gor'kii, Surikov, Repin, Glinka, 
Tchaikovsky, Rimskii-Korsakov, Mendeleev, Timiriazev, Pavlov, 
Michurin, Tsiolkovskii . . .. All of this speaks to the Russian people's role 
in the development of world culture.44 
Triumphant recognition of such an array of cultural figures from the ancien 
rPgime - and their specific identification as ethnic Russians - signaled the 
scope and direction of the new line. The transformation of A. S. Pushkin into 
an icon of official Soviet literature during January and February of 1937 
catalyzed this revival of prominent names and heroes from the pre- 
revolutionary Russian past. Tsarist-era political and military figures like 
Aleksandr Nevskii, Peter the Great, Aleksandr Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov 
were even rehabilitated later that Shortly thereafter, Bolkhevik, the 
party's main theoretical journal, would wax rhapsodic that "the history of the 
Russian people is the history of their heroic fight for independence and 
freedom against numerous enemies, conquerors and  interventionist^."^^ 
Placing the Russians at the head of the multiethnic Soviet family of peoples, 
the Minor Soviet Encyclopedia would argue on the eve of the War that "the 
culture of the USSR's peoples is historically tied to the culture of the Russian 
people. It has always experienced and will continue to experience the 
benevolent influence of the advanced Russian culture."47 Unmistakable here is 
a shift in emphasis in Soviet ideology from the workers as the vanguard class 
of the Soviet experiment to the Russian people as its vanguard nation.48 
Russocentrism and the celebration of the Russian historical past would form 
an important part of official propaganda campaigns until after Stalin's death in 
1953. 
But why such an about face from proletarian internationalism to 
nationalism? What can explain such heresy? As alluded to above, a pragmatic 
and urgent need for mobilization predicated this sea-change in party ideology. 
By the early 1930s, the propaganda of the previous decade was increasingly 
seen as being excessively abstract, inaccessibly arcane and insufficiently 
populist. Importantly, the new campaigns surrounding Soviet-era heroes were 
quickly complemented by the revival of historical personalities from the 
national past. Instructive is one of the first major challenges to the historical 
materialist line of the 1920s which occurred during a Politburo discussion of 
public school history textbooks in March 1934. Objecting to the presentations 
of several distinguished Bolshevik pedagogues, Stalin launched into a vicious 
critique of their advocacy of textbooks that privileged materialism and class 
analysis over a more traditional historical narrative.49 A leading ideologist 
present at the meeting paraphrased Stalin's remarks several days later: 
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These textbooks and the instruction [of history] itself is far from what is 
needed, and Comrade Stalin talked about this at the Politburo meeting. 
The textbooks and the instruction [of history in the schools] itself is 
done in such a way that sociology is substituted for history .... What 
generally results is some kind of odd scenario [neponiatnaia kartina] for 
Marxists - a sort of bashful relationship - [in which] they attempt not 
to mention tsars and attempt not to mention prominent representatives of 
the bourgeoisie . . .. We cannot write history in this way! Peter was Peter, 
Catherine was Catherine. They relied on specific classes and represented 
their mood and interests, but all the same they took action - these were 
historic individuals - they were not ours, but we must give an 
impression of this epoch, about the events which took place at that time, 
who ruled, what sort of a government there was, what sort of policies 
were carried out, and how events transpired. Without this, we won't have 
any sort of civil history.50 
Stalin's commentary was understood by insiders as a call for the revival of 
conventional state- and personality-based narratives in historically-oriented 
propaganda. A. S. Bubnov, the Commissar of Education, followed up on 
Stalin's prescriptions at a historians' conference later that month. Focusing on 
the excessively schematic (or "sociological") approach to history reflected in 
the historiography of the 1920s, Bubnov complained that theory was 
dominating the discussion of history in the schools, leaving events, 
personalities, and their interconnection to play only a secondary role. As a 
result, he noted, "an entire array of the most important historical figures, 
events, wars, etc. slips past [our students] unnoticed.. .. Under such conditions, 
we have a very large over-encumbrance of what can be referred to as the 
sociological component, and a major lack, even a complete absence in some 
places, of what can be referred to as pragmatic hi~tory."~' Such calls for 
"pragmatic history" (or "a usable past") echoed throughout such forums during 
the mid-1930s. Synchronized with the above-mentioned explosion of patriotic 
rhetoric in the press, "pragmatic history" was to catch people's imaginations 
and promote a unified sense of identity that the previous decade's materialism 
had failed to stimulate. 
Aside from the changes in tone and content, however, we see in Stalin's 
recommendations something else as well: the endorsement of what was 
essentially an etatist interpretation of the pre-revolutionary history of the 
USSR. Such redirection of historiographic priorities to highlight statehood - 
particularly Russian statehood - is significant, as we see here the outline of 
an agenda to replace the 1920s' broad "multicultural" materialist focus on the 
history of classes and peoples with a single, linear, nation-based narrative.52 
Such an impression is confirmed by an account of another Politburo discussion 
from March 1934 in which Bubnov proposed that the official historical line 
ought to concern not just the linear pre-revolutionary "history of the USSR," 
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but a broader and more inclusive "history of the peoples of Russia." 
Interrupting him, Stalin disagreed, implying that such a focus was excessively 
diffuse. Asserting that a single thousand-year political narrative ought to be at 
the center of the new curriculum, he noted simplistically that "the Russian 
people in the past gathered the other peoples together and have begun that sort 
of gathering again now."53 Although terse, Stalin was visibly rejecting a 
multicultural history of the region in favor of a historical narrative which 
would implicitly focus on the Russian people's state-building across time. 
When the next generation of history textbooks rolled off the presses in 1937, 
they dovetailed perfectly with this vision of the "usable past,"54 as did some of 
the biggest films of the day which also valorized pre-revolutionary princes, 
monarchs and generals, e.g. Peter the First, Alebandr Nevskii, Minin and 
Pozharskii, Suvorov, etc.55 The same idea also reverberates throughout a toast 
that Stalin gave at K. E. Voroshilov's dacha after reviewing the Red Square 
parade commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the revolution in 1937: 
I want to say a few words which may not seem too festive. The Russian 
tsars did much that was bad. They robbed and enslaved the people. They 
led wars and seized territory in the interests of the landowners. But they 
did do one good thing - they put together an enormous state 
[stretching] out to Kamchatka. We inherited this state. We Bolsheviks 
were the first to put together and strengthen this state not in the interests 
of the landowners and capitalists, but for the toilers and for all the great 
peoples who make up this state.56 
Etatist sympathies, then, in conjunction with a strong current of populism and 
frustration with the purges' paralysis of propaganda revolving around Soviet 
heroes, led the party hierarchy to conclude that the most effective historical 
narrative for the diverse Soviet population would be a Russian-centered one 
stressing old-fashioned values like state-building and national d e f e n ~ e . ~ ~  Late 
in the decade, Stalin would even call for adjustments to be made to the official 
conceptualization of "Soviet patriotism" in order to account for the shift.58 M. 
I. Kalinin responded to Stalin's calls to "develop and cultivate" the concept in 
1940 with the announcement that "Soviet patriotism" at its core was a sense of 
pride and loyalty which had united both Russians and the "most conscious 
elements of the oppressed nationalities'' under the progressive banner of 
Russian "national culture" since the mid-nineteenth century.59 Such a 
russocentric vision was the end result of the "ideological metamorphosis" that 
Aleksandrova had identified in 1937. In the words of another exile writing at 
about the same time, Soviet patriotism during the second half of the 1930s had 
become "simply Russian patrioti~rn."~~ 
It should come as no surprise that some in the Soviet society of the 1930s 
were horrified by this ideological turn-about. In early 1939, a veteran leftist 
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literary critic named V I. Blium even had the audacity to complain directly to 
Stalin in a personal letter about how "socialist patriotism sometimes and in 
some places is starting to display all the characteristics of racial nationalism." 
But the party hierarchy remained committed to the new line,6' even amplifying 
it somewhat between 194 1 and 1945. Little else of substance changed until the 
mid-1950s. 
This article has traced the changing semantics of Soviet mobilizational 
ideology during the 1930s, focusing on the wane of internationalism, the 
emergence of Soviet patriotism and the remodulation of this concept away from 
a focus on a Soviet heroic Olympus toward a pantheon of heroes drawn chiefly 
from the pre-revolutionary Russian historical past. This shift toward 
russocentrism in interwar Soviet ideology has long been a source of scholarly 
controversy. Some have linked this phenomenon to nationalist sympathies 
within the party hierarchy,62 while others have attributed it to eroding prospects 
for world r ev~ lu t ion ,~~  and the Stalinist elite's revision of Marxist principles.64 
Others associate the transformation with increasing threats from the outside 
domestic e t a t i ~ m ~ ~  and administrative pragmatism.67 Still others 
contend that the phenomenon really only matured in the 1940s in connection 
with the exigencies of the German invasion.68 A few even deny that it occurred 
at all.69 With A. M. Dubrovskii, I have argued elsewhere that russocentric 
themes were privileged in Soviet ideology during the late 1930s within the 
context of the decade's etatist tendencies. The evolution of the official historical 
line during these years indicates that the era's reliance on the Russian national 
past, heroes and myths was a nativist move to popularize a single historical 
narrative on the pre-revolutionary era for the USSR's poorly-educated citizenry. 
Put another way, a new sense of pragmatism came to the fore in the party 
hierarchy of the 1930s which concluded that the utopian proletarian 
internationalism that had typified Soviet ideology during its first fifteen years 
was inhibiting the mobilization of Soviet society for industrialization and war. 
Searching for a more populist rallying call, Stalin and his inner circle eventually 
settled upon russocentric etatism as the most efficient way to promote state- 
building and popular loyalty to the regime.70 
But critical to this story is the thesis advanced in the present article: that 
much of the primacy of the era's emphasis on russocentrism and pre- 
revolutionary glory ought to be seen as a syndrome of the purges' hamstringing 
of parallel propaganda campaigns revolving around "Soviet patriotism" and the 
heroes of the revolution and socialist construction. Because the party hierarchs' 
interest in the tsarist past was so instrumental, they seem to have expected, ca. 
1935, that themes, imagery and other elements drawn from the "pragmatic 
history" of the pre-revolutionary time period could CO-exist with other more 
"Soviet" aspects of the official propaganda line. The USSR's Olympus was to be 
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an integrated one, with Peter the Great, Aleksandr Nevskii and A. S. Pushkin 
joining Chapaev, Dzerzhinskii, Frunze, Shchors, Enukidze, Rykov, Kosarev, 
Khodzhaev, Egorov and numerous Stakhanovites in a heroic pantheon styled 
according to the reigning aesthetics of Socialist Realism. 
However, as manic purging in the mid-to-late 1930s destabilized industry, 
the Red Army command, and the party itself, many Soviet members of the 
party's nascent pantheon of heroes were swept into the deluge as well. 
Mobilization "by example" was greatly complicated by the sudden arrest or 
disappearance of celebrated workers, managers, party officials and military 
commanders, something which in the short term required the reissuing of many 
canonical propaganda texts and in the long term threatened to compromise the 
entire pantheon itself. At times, it must have seemed as if only Socialist 
Realism'sJictional heroes - Pave1 Korchagin, Gleb Chumalov and others - 
did not risk arrest.71 
If the new line's emphasis on russocentric themes and leaders from the 
tsarist past had been initially off-set (or even over-shadowed) by the 
popularization of Soviet heroes from the civil war era and on-going socialist 
construction, the purges' destruction of many of these prominent personalities 
between 1936 and 1938 complicated this genre of propaganda and contributed 
to a shift toward an increasing emphasis on heroes from the distant past. Attrition 
within the ranks of the "Soviet patriots" (Enukidze, Rykov, Kosarev, Khodzhaev, 
Egorov, etc.) left the pantheon composed principally of traditional Russian 
national heroes (Nevskii, Peter, Pushkin) and a handful of remaining 
revolutionaries (Lenin, Stalin, Frunze, Dzerzhinskii, Shchors, etc.). 
Consequently, increased reliance on traditional Russian heroes was virtually 
inevitable: not only were the Peters and Nevskiis at least as recognizable as the 
Fmnzes and Shchors', but they were also often more heroic (at least according 
to traditional aesthetics) and less likely to be compromised by the purges?* In 
this sense, the faltering of the Soviet patriotism campaign during the Great 
Terror contributed to the ascendancy of a russocentric vision of the USSR's 
"usable past" which would prove to be durable and dynamic enough to script 
Soviet propaganda campaigns over the course of the next twenty years. 
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